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California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 877,
877.5 and 877.6: The Settlement Game in the
Ballpark that Tech-Bilt.
The common problem, yours, mine, everyone's
Is - not to fancy what were fair in life
Provided it could be - but, finding first
What may be, then find how to make it fair
Up to our means ....
Robert Browning, 1812-1889
Bishop Blougram's Apology,
line 87 (1855).
I. INTRODUCTION
The apportionment of loss among multiple defendants is a big
money garne in California. Because of the tremendous importance of
this area of the law to all parties in multiple defendant cases, close
examination of the underlying policies and practical application of
the rules in California is essential, especially in light of Tech-Bilt, Inc.
v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates.1 Courts deciding cases in this area
of the law historically have had to balance two competing policies:
the equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and the en-
couragement of settlement. This comment will examine the source
of these policies and how courts have viewed and will continue to
view the requirement of good faith2 when scrutinizing settlements.
Finally, the practical application of the criteria handed down by the
court in Tech-Bilt will be discussed, particularly in connection with
sliding scale recovery agreements.3
II. THE ASSERTION OF THE POLICY OF EQUITY
In 1975, the California Supreme Court considered the issue of as-
sessment of liability in relation to the proportional fault of the plain-
tiff in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California.4 Prior to Li, California
adhered to the all-or-nothing doctrine of contributory negligence.
Under this doctrine, an injured plaintiff would be completely barred
1. 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
2. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 877-877.5 (West 1980).
3. Id. at § 877.5.
4. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
from recovering damages5 if the defendant(s) could successfully show
that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
This precept held true regardless of the degree of the plaintiff's neg-
ligence, provided the negligent conduct contributed as a legal cause to
the injury.6 The Li majority recognized the core of the criticism to
the contributory negligence rule to be that, "the doctrine is inequita-
ble in its operation because it fails to distribute responsibility in pro-
portion to fault." 7
The principle command of the Li court became "[l]iability for dam-
age will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct pro-
portion to their respective fault."8 Thus, California was brought into
a comparative negligence scheme based on fault, under which a plain-
tiff's recovery would be diminished in proportion to the plaintiff's
fault.9 The court's primary concern in Li was the apportionment of
liability between a plaintiff and defendant; however, the principles
enunciated in Li have been utilized to apportion liability in multiple
defendant litigation. The lead case in California concerning treat-
ment of multiple defendant apportionment is American Motorcycle
Association v. Superior Court.lo This case was decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in 1978, nearly three years after the Li
decision.
The plaintiff in American Motorcycle was a teenage boy who suf-
5. For cases decided under the doctrine of contributory negligence, see Billeter v.
Rhodes & Jamieson, 104 Cal. App. 2d 137, 231 P.2d 93 (1951) (contributory negligence
of invitee); Markham v. Hancock Oil Co., 2 Cal. App. 2d 392, 37 P.2d 1087 (1934); Elsey
v. Domecq, 114 Cal. App. 42, 299 P. 794 (1931).
6. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. For a definition of
contributory negligence, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965), which
states,
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the plaintiff which falls be-
low the standard to which he should conform for his own protection, and
which is a legally contributing cause co-operating with the negligence of the
defendant in bringing about the plaintiff's harm.
Id.
7. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862 (footnote omitted).
The court reasoned that arguments in support of the contributory negligence doctrine
fall far short of justifying the doctrine in light of "intelligent notions of fairness." Id.
at 811, 532 P.2d at 1231, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 863. "[I]n a system in which liability is based
on fault, the extent of fault should govern the extent of liability .... " Id.
8. Id. at &13, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864 (footnote omitted).
9. The Li court adopted a "pure" form of comparative negligence. Id. at 828-29,
532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. This form of comparative negligence "assign[s]
responsibility and liability for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negligence
of each of the parties." Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. The "50 per-
cent" system commands that liability be apportioned based on fault up to the point
where the defendant's negligence remains greater than that of the plaintiff. Once the
defendant's negligence is ascertained to be 50 percent or less, a plaintiff's recovery is
barred. The 50 percent system was rejected by the court. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 231 § 85 (West 1985). For a system in which a plaintiff must be less than 50
percent at fault to recover, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1973 & Supp. 1984).
10. 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
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fered a crushed spine from a crash in a motorcycle event that was or-
ganized by the American Motorcycle Association (AMA) and the
Viking Motorcycle Club (VMC).11 The boy, who was a participant in
the race, brought an action naming AMA and VMC as defendants
based on AMA's and VMC's alleged negligence in staging the sports
event.12 AMA filed a motion for leave to file a cross-complaint. The
proposed cross-complaint asserted two causes of action. The first was
for indemnity from the boy's parents, based upon the parents' alleged
negligence in the supervision of their son.13 The second was for a
declaration by the court of the parents' "allocable negligence,"14 so
that damages against the named defendants could be reduced by this
amount. Although the trial court was critical of the then existing
state of the law, it denied AMA's motion for leave to file a cross-
complaint.15
Generally, two doctrines of law exist for defendants to use in dis-
tributing a payment made to a plaintiff among themselves: contribu-
tion and equitable indemnity. 16 The doctrine of contribution allows
for the apportionment of loss between multiple tortfeasors in order
to equalize a common burden.17 The rule of equitable indemnity al-
lows for the recovery of the entire amount one has paid from another
11. Id. at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
12. Id. In its answer, AMA claimed the boy's negligence was a proximate cause of
his injuries. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186. This invoked the Li prin-
ciples of apportionment of liability in consideration of plaintiff's negligence. See supra
notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
13. Am;rican Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
Indemnity, as it then existed in California, was an equitable doctrine that entirely
shifted the loss from one tortfeasor to another. "Indemnity allows one who has dis-
charged a common obligation to recover the entire amount he has paid from the party
primarily liable." Comment, Contribution and Indemnity in California, 57 CALIF. L.
REV. 490, 492 (1969) (emphasis added).
AMA's argument was that by signing the parental consent form required for entry
in the race, the parents had "actively" engaged in negligent conduct, while AMA's neg-
ligence, if there was any, was "passive." Thus, AMA sought equitable indemnity.
American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
14. Id. at 585, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186. AMA was proceeding on the
assumption that Li annulled the rule of joint and several liability and replaced it with
a rule of "proportionate liability," where a concurrent tortfeasor could only be held
liible "for a, portion of plaintiff's recovery, determined on a comparative fault basis."
Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186 (emphasis in original).
15. The court of appeal perceived the need for a speedy resolution of the issues
presented in multiple party litigation, and thus granted a peremptory writ of mandate.
Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
16. See, e.g., American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 190; Comment, supra note 13, at 491.
17. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
tortfeasor who is primarily liable.1s Both doctrines are grounded in
equitable considerations.19 Commentators, focusing on the outcome
- namely the eventual allocation of the burden - have concluded
that "indemnity is only an extreme form of contribution. '" 20 Practi-
cally speaking, this position may hold some truth; however, the doc-
trines are based on a difference in the degree of culpability of the
defendants (i.e., one party who is relatively blameless is being asked
to bear the blameworthy party's burden). Contribution addresses it-
self to a pool of relatively equally culpable tortfeasors.2 1 With these
doctrines available, American Motorcycle was appealed to the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court for determination.
American Motorcycle took as its signpost the utopic goal pro-
pounded by the Li court, that of "a system under which liability for
damage will be borne by those whose negligence caused it in direct
proportion to their respective fault."22 After a study of the equitable
indemnity doctrine in light of Li, the California Supreme Court con-
cluded that modification of traditional distribution doctrines was in
order. The doctrine of partial equitable indemnity was introduced
whereby a concurrent tortfeasor could obtain indemnity on a compar-
18. See, e.g, Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tor(feasors, 81 U. PA. L.
REV. 130, 131 (1932).
19. Furnish, Distributing Tort Liability: Contribution and Indemnity in Iowa, 52
IOWA L. REV. 31, 33, 48-49 (1966) (considerations of unjust enrichment and restriction);
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 & comment b (1937).
20. Slattery v. Marra Bros., 186 F.2d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1951) (Judge Learned Hand).
See also American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
21. The California statutory right of contribution provides for contribution on a
pro rata basis, and does not consider the degree of fault. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE
§ 875 (West 1980), which provides,
(a) Where a money judgment has been rendered jointly against two or more
defendants in a tort action there shall be a right of contribution among them
as hereinafter provided.
(b) Such right of contribution shall be administered in accordance with the
principles of equity.
(c) Such right of contribution may be enforced only after one tortfeasor has,
by payment, discharged the joint judgment or has paid more than his pro rata
share thereof. It shall be limited to the excess so paid over the pro rata share
of the person so paying and in no event shall any tortfeasor be compelled to
make contribution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire judgment.
(d) There shall be no right of contribution in favor of any tortfeasor who has
intentionally injured the injured person.
(e) A liability insurer who by payment has discharged the liability of a
tortfeasor judgment debtor shall be subrogated to his right of contribution.
(f) This title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law, and
where one tortfeasor judgment debtor is entitled to indemnity from another
there shall be no right of contribution between them.
(g) This title shall not impair the right of a plaintiff to satisfy a judgment in
full as against any tortfeasor judgment debtor.
Id.
22. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. The phrase was
quoted by the American Motorcycle majority. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 583,
591, 598, 578 P.2d at 902, 907, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185, 190, 195.
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ative fault basis23 instead of the previous all-or-nothing doctrine of
indemnity. The doctrine of indemnity had become the primary allo-
cator of loss among joint tortfeasors because the California legisla-
ture had, for all practical purposes, frozen the development of the
doctrine of contribution. This compelled practitioners to use the doc-
trine of indemnity to obtain any real relief.24 Before American Mo-
torcycle, the equitable indemnity doctrine had been difficult to wield
due to vague standards for indemnification. 25 However, the American
Motorcycle court looked beyond the issue of imprecision in the stan-
dards for indemnification 26 and attacked the very foundation of the
rule. The court noticed that although equitable indemnity was adver-
tised as having been based on equitable considerations, in cases where
equity would have dictated apportionment in proportion to culpabil-
ity, the loss had been administered in an all-or-nothing fashion.27 To
facilitate the administration of equitable justice through the use of
the equitable doctrine of indemnity, partial indemnity on a compara-
tive fault basis was mandated.28
23. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 591, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
24. In 1957, California passed legislation that restricted a tortfeasor's right to con-
tribution to a narrow set of circumstances. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 875 (West 1980).
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West Supp. 1985), concerning sliding scale recovery
agreements, was added in 1977. See 1977 Cal. Stat. 1798.
California had espoused the principle that the law would not aid a tortfeasor, and
thus a joint tortfeasor had no right to contribution. See, e.g., Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel.
Co., 162 Cal. 1:36, 121 P. 379 (1912). The equitable indemnity rule was created as an
exception to the contribution rules in San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 130, 330
P.2d 802, 803-04 (1958). The Ho Sing court relied on the fact that a majority of com-
mon law jurisdictions adhered to a rule of indemnification. Id. at 131-32, 330 P.2d at
804. It also relied on the Supreme Court decision in Washington Gaslight Co. v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 (1896), cited in Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d at 132, 330 P.2d at
804. In Washington Gaslight, the Court found that it is only fair that when two indi-
viduals are responsible for a loss, the more culpable individual should bear a greater
share of the loss. 161 U.S. at 327-28.
25. Some authorities attempted to classify negligence on the more culpable side as
"active," "primary," or "positive" and on the less culpable side as "passive," "secon-
dary," or "negative" in deciding whether indemnification should be allowed. See Da-
vis, Indemnity Between Negligent Tortfeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV.
517, 538-44 (1952); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 130, 155-56 (1932). Other authorities relied on criteria such as whether liability
was "primary," "secondary," "constructive," or "derivative." See Comment, Procedure
- Third Party Practice - Non-Contractual Indemnification, 28 MO. L. REV. 307, 308-
09 (1963). Under these tests it is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a general rule
of when indemnification takes place. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Lan
Franco, 267 Cal. App. 2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1968); PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS
343 (5th ed. 1984).
26. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 596, 578 P.2d at 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
27. Id. at 596-97, 578 P.2d at 910-11, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 193-94.
28. Id. at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
III. THE POLICY OF ENCOURAGING SETTLEMENT
With the ever-increasing number of lawsuits in California, settle-
ment has become an important and expeditious manner of resolving
lawsuits without which current California jurisprudence would be
rendered inoperative. Thus, the law favors settlements.29 Settle-
ment provides for both peace and goodwill in the community, and the
reduction of expense and persistence in litigation.3 0 It also favors the
compromise of doubtful rights and controversies.31 To this end, and
in recognition of the fundamental policy, the legislature enacted sec-
tions 87732 and 877.633 of the California Code of Civil Procedure. Ap-
pellate courts have interpreted these sections as encouraging
29. E.g., Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 602, 234 P.2d 16,
22 (1951) ("[t]he law wisely favors settlements"); Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal.
App. 2d 679, 696, 319 P.2d 69, 79 (1957) ("it is fundamental that the law favors
settlements").
30. See Estate of Johanson, 62 Cal. App. 2d 41, 56, 144 P.2d 72, 80 (1943) ("Com-
promises are favored in law and a man is allowed to negotiate for the purchase of his
peace without prejudice to his rights."); accord McClure v. McClure, 100 Cal. 339, 343,
34 P. 822, 824 (1893).
31. Potter v. Pacific Coast Lumber Co. of Cal., 37 Cal. 2d 592, 600, 234 P.2d 16, 20
(1951); Hamilton v. Oakland School Dist., 219 Cal. 322, 329, 26 P.2d 296, 299 (1933); Es-
tate of Johanson, 62 Cal. App. 2d 41, 56, 144 P.2d 72, 80 (1943).
32. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). Section 877 provides:
Where a release, dismissal with or without prejudice, or a covenant not to sue
or not to enforce judgment is given in good faith before verdict or judgment to
one or more of a number of tortfeasors claimed to be liable for the same
tort-
(a) It shall not discharge any other such tortfeasor from liability unless its
terms so provide, but it shall reduce the claims against the others in the
amount stipulated by the release, the dismissal or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it whichever is the greater; and
(b) It shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for
any contribution to any other tortfeasors.
Id. See also Adler, Allocation of Responsibility After American Motorcycle Association
v. Superior Court, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 1, 27 (1978) (The author of the article, Erwin
E. Adler, represented the Petitioner, American Motorcycle Association, in American
Motorcycle).
Section 877 does not bar other grounds for indemnity, such as contractual agree-
ments. See, e.g., Peck Contractors v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 3d 828, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 754 (1984).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1986). Section 877.6 provides, in per-
tinent part, as follows:
(a) Any party to an action wherein it alleged that two or more parties are
joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of
a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more
alleged tortfeasors ....
(c) A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith
shall bar any other joint tortfeasor from any further claims against the set-
tling tortfeasor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or compara-
tive indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.
(d) The party asserting the lack of good faith shall have the burden of proof
on that issue.
Id.
The legislature, by enacting section 877.6, specifically codified dictum in American
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settlements.34 The statutes achieve that goal by releasing a settling
tortfeasor from liability to other tortfeasors after a good faith settle-
ment has been reached with the plaintiff.3 5
The determination of "good faith" under these sections is most im-
portant to all parties in the litigation, for without it, a settling
tortfeasor is not protected from the demands of a nonsettling
tortfeasor for partial equitable indemnity. Though courts are aware
of this importance, the criteria of what constitutes good faith has
changed dramatically over time.36 This change has its roots in the
ever present battle for preeminence between the policies discussed:
the equitable distribution of fault between tortfeasors and the en-
couragement of settling cases before trial.
IV. THE GOOD FAITH REQUIREMENT: A CASUALTY OF CONFLICT
Appellate! courts in California, 37 as well as the Ninth Circuit Court
Motorcycle. See American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 518 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr.
at 198.
[W]e conclude that from a realistic perspective the legislative policy underly-
ing the provision [section 877] dictates that a tortfeasor who has entered into a
'good faith' settlement [citation omitted] with the plaintiff must also be dis-
charged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be
pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.
Id. See also Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 283, 188
Cal. Rptr. 580, 582 (1983).
34. Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846
(1976); Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 34 Cal. App. 3d 391, 396,
110 Cal. Rptr. 48, 51 (1973); River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App.
3d 986, 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 503 (1972).
35. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1984).
The question of what constitutes a "lack of good faith" was left to the courts. See
River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 989, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 500. It is also significant
to note that "bad faith" is not required, only the softer standard of lack of good faith is
required. A "joint tortfeasor" under section 877.6(c) is a joint, concurrent or successive
tortfeasor. Norton- Villiers, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 283, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582.
Procedurally, after a finding of "good faith," the party who settled in "good faith"
brings a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the cross-complaint, or action, for
partial indemnity. Northrop Corp. v. Stinson Sales Corp., 151 Cal. App. 3d 653, 658, 199
Cal. Rptr. 16, 19 (1984).
36. For a complete collection of cases bearing on this issue, see Roberts, The "Good
Faith" Settlem-nt: An Accommodation of Competing Goals, 17 LoY. L.A.L. REV. 841,
854-81 (1984).
37. See, e.g., Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co., 171
Cal. App. 3d 681, 217 Cal. Rtpr. 522 (1985); Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90,
199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47
(1984); Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Wid-
son v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984); Ford
Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1983); Kohn v. Superior
Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d
of Appeals,38 have been unable to give litigants guidelines for finding
good faith that could stand the test of time. For this reason, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court took the opportunity provided by Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates39 to halt the erosion of the
good faith requirement of section 877.6 and to provide guidelines for
the courts of appeal in future cases.
To understand the importance of Tech-Bilt, and the incongruity in
the law regarding good faith, two earlier cases should be first ex-
amined: River Garden Farms v. Superior Court,40 and Cardio Sys-
tems v. Superior Court.41
River Garden Farms was decided in 1972, six years before Ameri-
can Motorcycle and eight years before the adoption of section 877.6;
yet the interpretation of good faith in River Garden Farms was ulti-
mately approved in Tech-Bilt.42 The suit in River Garden Farms cen-
tered around two children who were severely injured in a fire that
claimed the lives of their parents. The wrongful death and personal
injury claims of the children were settled as to all defendants except
River Garden Farms. River Garden Farms objected to plaintiffs'
736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983); Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal.
App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983); Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982), overruled by, Tech-bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde
& Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985); Cardio Systems, Inc. v.
Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), overruled by, Tech-Bilt,
Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256
(1985); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981),
overruled by, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159,
213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr.
47 (1980); Mill Valley Refuse Co. v. Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 707, 166 Cal. Rptr.
687 (1980); Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976);
Lareau v. Southern Pac. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975); River Gar-
den Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
38. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983); Commercial Union Ins.
Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The
Ninth Circuit, because the California Supreme Court had not yet spoken, was free to
speculate as to how the California Supreme Court would resolve the issues presented.
For this reason, the Ninth Circuit decisions deviated from the trend of the California
Courts of Appeal, but set out principles that the supreme court would espouse in Tech-
Bilt. The ability of plaintiffs, to forum shop may have been an added incentive for the
Tech-Bilt decision. Tech-Bilt cited both of the Ninth Circuit cases mentioned above. See
Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 496-97, 497 n.6, 698 P.2d at 164-65, 165 n.6, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261-
62, 262 n.6.
39. 146 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 194 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1983). The supreme court reversed
the court of appeal in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698
P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985). For a brief analysis of the Tech-Bilt decision, see
California Supeme Court Survey, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 260 (1985).
40. 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
41. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981), overruled by, Tech-Bilt, Inc. v.
Woodward-Clyde & Assoc., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985).
42. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 496, 698 P.2d at 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261 ("the Legisla-
ture intended the term 'good faith' in section 877.6 to bear the meaning ascribed to
that term in section 877 by the Court of Appeal's decision in River Garden Farms
. . . . "1).
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counsel allocating a disproportionate share of the settlement pro-
ceeds to the wrongful death claims. Under California Code of Civil
Procedure section 877,43 River Garden Farms would receive credit for
the amount of settlement paid by the settlors, but because of the dis-
proportionate allocation of moneys to the wrongful deaths claims,
River Garden Farms had a greater potential liability.44 For this rea-
son, as a nonsettling party, River Garden Farms alleged that the
plaintiffs alone were not acting in "good faith" as required by section
877.
The court held that the good faith requirement of section 877 ex-
tended to all tortfeasors, settling and nonsettling alike,45 but recog-
nized that "[t]he goals of equitable sharing and settlement finality
compete with each other."46 Thus, while the court was required to
strike a balamce between these goals, top priority was given to serving
these dual interests, since the court believed the 1957 legislature had
established them.47
The court's balancing approach produced the "reasonable range"
test of good faith. The court reiterated that any settlement in good
faith would be final, even if a jury later returns a verdict that would
make the settlement figure appear disproportionate, thus appeasing
the policy of encouragement of settlement.48 The test indicated that
the court "'should not invalidate a settlement within a reasonable
43. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980). See supra note 32 for the full text of
section 877.
44. This is so because one of the defendants connected with River Garden Farms
was an employer, and, as an employer, plaintiff's exclusive remedy was worker's com-
pensation. See River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 990, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 501. Also,
the value of the personal injury claim was appraised as substantially more than the
wrongful death claims. Id. at 991, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
45. Id. at 999, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
46. Id. at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
47. Id. at 999, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 507 ("To promote equitable distribution of the loss,
the statute [section 877] permits post-judgment contribution .... The second statu-
tory objective, encouragement of settlement .... ") (emphasis added). Tech-Bilt
quoted River Garden Farms and reaffirmed the priority given the policies by the River
Garden Farm. court: "'The major goals of the 1957 tort contribution legislation are,
first, equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and second, encouragement
of settlements.'" Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal Rtpr. at 260
(quoting River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503).
48. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
If the good faith clause demands equitable sharing as fixed by a jury verdict
which has not yet taken place, the parties cannot negotiate safely, [and] can-
not accomplish settlement with a fair assurance of finality .... When one
tortfeasor chooses to settle and another chooses to litigate, inequality in the
ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith.
Id.
range of the settlor's fair share."49 Thirteen years later, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court accepted the ground rules that the River Garden
Farms court had laid down for determining good faith under this
standard:
The price levels are not as unpredictable as one might suppose. Despite the
uncertainties, generalized valuation criteria are recognized by the personal in-
jury bar, insurance claims departments and pretrial settlement courts. When
testing the good faith of a settlement figure, a court may enlist the guidance
of the judge's personal experience and of experts in the field. Represented by
knowledgeable counsel, settlement negotiators can predict with some assur-
ance whether a settlement is within the reasonable range permitted by the
criterion of good faith. The danger that a low settlement violates the good
faith clause will not impart uncertainty so long as the parties behave fairly
and the courts maintain a realistic awareness of settlement imponderables.5 0
The court in River Garden Farms also prophetically perceived that
"if the policy of encouraging settlements is permitted to overwhelm
equitable financial sharing, the possibilities of unfair tactics are mul-
tiplied. Neither statutory goal should be applied to defeat the
other."51
Over the next decade, appellate courts, failing to heed the warning
of the River Garden Farms court, tipped the delicate balance be-
tween the equitable distribution of fault and the encouragement of
settlement in favor of settling cases. The focal point of the analysis
of these cases was how the term "good faith" was to be construed.
The case of Cardio Systems v. Superior Court,5 2 decided in 1981, typi-
fied the extent to which appellate courts were willing to stretch the
term "good faith."
In Cardio, a man died on the operating table during open-heart
surgery due to a defective machine distributed by Cardio. The
machine was incorrectly assembled and a tube incorrectly injected air
into the heart rather than creating a suction to remove blood from
the heart. Cardio was originally named as a party defendant, but was
later dismissed for a waiver of costs alone. The reason for the dismis-
sal was one of trial strategy - plaintiff's counsel believed that a sim-
ple medical malpractice case would become a complex products
liability case if Cardio remained a defendant. Despite the fact that
49. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
50. Id. at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506-07 (footnote omitted), quoted in Tech-Bilt, 38
Cal. 3d at 500-01, 698 P.2d at 167-68, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264-65.
The justification for the reasonable range test, that it can be administered with rela-
tive ease, is not without its critics. Chief Justice Bird dissented in Tech-Bilt stating,
"[The reasonable range test] will not only discourage settlements, but will place an in-
tolerable burden on our trial courts." Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502, 698 P.2d at 169, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 266 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). "Contrary to the majority's assertions, such a
rule will unduly discourage settlements and severely burden the trial courts by con-
vert[ing] the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full-scale mini-trial." Id. at
508, 698 P.2d at 173, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 270.
51. River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 998, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
52. 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981).
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experts were willing to testify that.there was a defect in the machine,
plaintiff's counsel opted for the dismissal.
The hospital, also a defendant, eventually settled with the plaintiff
and pursued a cross-claim against Cardio for partial equitable indem-
nity. Cardio affirmatively defended against the cross-claim stating
that the good faith dismissal by plaintiff barred any such recovery.
The trial court rejected Cardio's argument because "the dismissal as
to Cardio, which was without consideration other than the waiver of
costs, [could not be] a good faith dismissal as that concept is used in
Code of Civil Procedure section 877."53
The appellate court, with reluctance, issued a writ of mandate that
directed the trial court to vacate its order. The court realized the in-
equity that would result - a defendant dismissed in exchange for
only a waiver of costs due to plaintiff's trial strategy was insulated
from a partial equitable indemnity claim asserted by the nonsettling
tortfeasors.54 The reason for the court's holding, and for the inequi-
table result, was that "good faith" was defined so as to ignore the pol-
icy of equitable distribution of fault. The court stated that
[A] settling defendant owes no duty to a nonsettling codefendant except to re-
frain from tortious or other wrongful conduct and that, absent such conduct, a
settling party may act to further its own interests without regard to the effect
of the settlement upon codefendants. [citation omitted] Cardio Systems acted
consistently with that principle and, under the rather simple terms of the
statute that. the settlement be in good faith, proceeded in good faith.
5 5
Sometime between the River Garden Farms and Cardio Systems
decisions, the "reasonable range" test was replaced by a test that con-
sidered only whether a tort has been committed upon a nonsettling
defendant -- the so-called "tortious conduct" test. Even though it
faced an inequitable result in Cardio Systems, the court of appeal for
the fifth district chose to let the legislature act, if it desired, to reach
a more equitable result and chose not to resurrect the River Garden
53. Id. at 883, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (footnote omitted). This is one of many exam-
ples in which the trial court had a sense of good faith superior to that of the court of
appeals. Clearly, if the spirit of Tech-Bilt is to be followed in the future, it is the trial
courts that must shoulder the burden.
54. Id. at 890-91, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260. The court's exact words were as follows:
The result is unsatisfactory. The rule permits a plaintiff to insulate a defend-
ant (Cardio) from being liable to a codefendant (Hospital) for comparative in-
demnity by dismissing against Cardio in consideration of a waiver of costs
where the dismissal is motivated by plaintiff's tactical considerations having
little relationship to the potential liability of Cardio . . . . The result is fun-
damentally unfair, and cannot be what the Legislature intended.
Id.
55. Id. at 890, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260.
Farms rationale.5 6
In conjunction with the abandonment of the "reasonable range"
test came the assertion, inbred from one dicta to another, that the
policy of encouraging settlement was preeminent over, and was un-
checked by, the equitable apportionment of liability among joint
tortfeasors.5 7 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit was applying a test of its
own,5 8 thus creating a tremendous impetus for the California
Supreme Court to resolve the issue. It was under these pressing cir-
cumstances that the supreme court granted a hearing in Tech-Bilt.
V. TECH-BILT, INC. V. WOODWARD-CLYDE & ASSOCIATES
The plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Andrew Fabula, bought residential
property developed by Tech-Bilt. Due to structural defects in their
residence, plaintiffs brought suit against Tech-Bilt and Woodward-
Clyde, the soils engineer. The claim against Woodward-Clyde was
barred by a ten-year statute of limitations.59 However, Woodward-
Clyde's counsel, before filing for summary judgment in the case,
made plaintiffs' counsel an offer - a waiver of costs incurred thus
far in defending the action in exchange for a dismissal with preju-
dice.60 Plaintiffs accepted the offer, but one month later, Tech-Bilt
filed an amended cross-complaint for indemnity and declaratory re-
lief, naming Woodward-Clyde as a cross-defendant. Woodward-Clyde
56. See id. at 891, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 260 ("[T]he Legislature should move with dis-
patch to prevent the occurrence of such an unfortunate result as in this case.").
57. This misinterpretation of California Code of Civil Procedure section 877 in
River Garden Farms appears to have its roots in the case of Stambaugh v. Superior
Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976). While paying lip service to the
proposition that "plac[ing] a disproportionate burden upon the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors [is] contrary to the rationale of the state's contribution statutes," id. at 235,
132 Cal. Rptr. at 846, the court of appeal for the first district surprisingly decided that
[e]xcept in rare cases of collusion or bad faith . . . [citations omitted] a joint
tortfeasor should be permitted to negotiate settlement of an adverse claim ac-
cording to his own best interests, whether for his financial advantage, or for
the purchase of peace and quiet, or otherwise. His good faith will not be de-
termined by the proportion his settlement bears to the damages of the claim-
ant. For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal
liability therefore is often uncertain or remote.
Id. at 238, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (emphasis added).
Not only does Stambaugh subordinate the equitable distribution of fault concept, but
it also makes it virtually extinct. Cases citing Stambaugh abound, with a resulting
schism in the law. See also Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 806-07,
173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 42-43 (1981) (overruled by Tech-Bilt) (Stambaugh applied in context
of sliding scale recovery agreement); Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434,
163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978) (prioritized settlement over equity). Roberts,
supra note 36.
58. See supra note 38.
59. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 337.15 (West 1982).
60. Woodward-Clyde's total "costs" amounted to $55. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 492
n.2, 698 P.2d at 161 n.2, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 258 n.2.
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rushed into court with the dismissal obtained from the plaintiffs; it
sought to have the "agreement" confirmed as a good faith settlement
under Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6, and moved for summary
judgment as to Tech-Bilt's cross-complaint. With a plethora of prece-
dent to justify its ruling,6 1 the lower court found the settlement to be
in good faith and entered summary judgment dismissing Tech-Bilt's
cross-complaint against Woodward-Clyde. The appellate court, not
surprisingly, affirmed this ruling.
The supreme court, however, set the record straight. After a brief
examination of the legislative history of sections 877 and 877.6, the
court cited. River Garden Farms for the proposition that "'[t]he ma-
jor goals of the 1957 tort contribution legislation are, first, equitable
sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and second, encourage-
ment of settlements.' "62 Invoking a renewed priority upon the true
legislative intent was the death-knell of the "settlement agreement"
between plaintiff and Woodward-Clyde, for under no circumstance
could a waiver of costs be a "good faith" settlement given the facts of
the case.6
3
The court did not create a new test for determining good faith64 in
a settlement under sections 877 and 877.6; rather, the court resur-
61. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1982); Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1931); Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843
(1976). Note that each of these cases was either impliedly or expressly disapproved of
by the Tech-Bilt court.
62. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 494, 698 P.2d at 163, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (quoting River
Garden Farrs, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 993, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 503). See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
63. Notice, however, that under Tech-Bilt a dismissal in exchange for a waiver of
costs is not per se evidence of a lack of good faith. Rather, under the "reasonable
range" test, the court receiving the agreement must decide whether the amount of set-
tlement was "in the ballpark." Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-500, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 263-64. Therefore, it is not inconceivable that a "ballpark" estimate of a
settlor's liability in a case would simply be the costs of the suit. However, for this to be
the case, the proportionate fault of the settlor must be marginal at best. For a more
detailed discussion of the criteria outlined in Tech-Bilt, see infra notes 64-67 and ac-
companying text.
64. Tech-Bilt simplified, from a statutory perspective, the meaning of "good faith,"
in that the court determined that "the Legislature intended the term 'good faith' in
section 877.6 -to bear the meaning ascribed to that term in section 877 by the Court of
Appeal's decision in River Garden Farms and by this court in American Motorcycle."
Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 496, 698 P.2d 164, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261. Therefore, there can be
no question that the Tech-Bilt decision was intended to cover the entire area .of settle-
ments, including sliding scale recovery agreements. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5
(West 1980). See also City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222
Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986); Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 605 (1985), petition for review granted, No. B007911 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985).
rected the River Garden Farms "reasonable range" test.65 The court
disapproved of a line of cases which defined good faith in settlement
as simply refraining from tortious or other wrongful conduct.66 In-
stead, the court reasoned that " 'good faith of the dismissal alone is
not sufficient. The dismissal must represent a settlement which is a
good faith determination of relative liabilities. Only in this situation
are both policies behind § 877 - equity and settlement - fur-
thered.' "67 Therefore, while bad faith tortious conduct continues,
the new test requires the court to inquire further into the substance
of the case to determine "whether the amount of the settlement is
within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional
share of comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries."68
The very nature of the "reasonable range" test precludes any
bright-line type of analysis in ascertaining reasonable range. Thus,
the court in applying the test could provide only touchstones for the
lower courts to use in determining good faith. It is clear, however,
that a settling defendant who pays "'less than his theoretical propor-
tionate or fair share'" has not violated the good faith requirement
per se.69 The reason is twofold: first, settlements would be unduly
discouraged;70 and second, the pretrial settlement approval procedure
Although not specifically mentioned in Tech-Bilt, section 877,5 does deal with settle-
ments and must satisfy "good faith" as determined under section 877.6. Id.
65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The decision of the supreme court
followed the recommendations of at least one scholar in the area. See Roberts, supra
note 36.
66. See Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
67. Id. at 497, 698 P.2d at 164-65, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62 (quoting Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981)).
68. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
69. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263 (quoting Dompeling v. Superior
Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44 (1981)). Ironically, Tech-Bilt also
disapproved Dompeling.
70. The court recognized that even with the "reasonable range" test, the reasons
for parties' willingness to settle have not changed. A virtual gratuitous dismissal in
the name of trial strategy or fear of high-powered experts will not be upheld as a good
faith dismissal. See, e.g., Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880,
176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). However, there exists, and the Tech-Bilt
decision allows for, practical economic justifications for a settlement figure below a
"fair share" level. See Mankoff, Structuring Settlements: An Update, 19 TRIAL 70
(Aug. 1983) (tax considerations); Danninger, Johnson & Lest, The Economics of Struc-
turing Settlements, 19 TRIAL 42 (June 1983); Phillips & Hawkins, Some Economic As-
pects of the Settlement Process: A Study of Personal Injury Claims, 39 MOD. L. REV.
497 (1976).
Two factors which generally affect a settlement figure are the present value of
money and the costs of continuing litigation. Moreover, with today's treble damage
statutes and large awards, particularly when insurance companies or "bad faith" is in-
volved, an important factor in deciding whether to settle is the understanding that ex-
emplary damages are rarely given in settlement. In a multiple defendant suit, with
both settling and nonsettling defendants, the settling defendants usually will not settle
unless the plaintiff foregoes recovery of punitive damages as against them. Perhaps
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would become, in effect, a mini-trial, straining the already over-
crowded courts.71 Nonetheless, the amount of the settlement is rele-
vant in determining good faith,72 for that amount must be equitable
in light of the following factors: 1) a rough approximation of plain-
tiff's total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability;73 2) the
allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; 3) a recognition
that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would have if he
were found liable after a trial; 4) financial conditions, including in-
surance policy limits;74 and 5) any indications of fraud, collusion or
most importamt is the realization that the factors influencing the court's determination
under the "reasonable range" test are far from pinpoint precision.
71. Tech.Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 502, 698 P.2d at 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting).
72. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1982) (plaintiff could continue litigation against the product manufacturer
and could accept no settlement from manufacturer for less than two million dollars,
equal to the aunount of the settling defendant's guarantee, without the settling defend-
ant's consent); Cardio Systems, Inc. v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1981) (one million dollar settlement with subsequent suit against a product
distributor for equitable indemnity); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d
798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981) ($100,000, the amount of defendant's insurance policy lim-
its, plus $10,000 on a sliding scale dependent upon plaintiff's recovery from the other
defendant).
73. Tech.Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. The court,
not accidentally, chose the term "rough approximation" in an attempt to placate the
policy of settlement and to make the process easier on a practical level. Both of these
concerns were raised by Chief Justice Bird in her dissent. See id. at 502-06, 698 P.2d at
168-71, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 256-58 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
74. The problems inherent in the acknowledgement of insurance policy limits as a
factor in settlement are grave. It is clear that a settlement for policy limits does not,
by itself, establish that a settlement is in good faith. See Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499,
698 P.2d at 1136-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64; Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d
941, 950, 195 Cal. Rptr. 470, 475 (1983). If this factor is given too much weight in the
good faith determination process, courts will be rewarding underinsured tortfeasors,
most likely at the expense of deep-pocket joint tortfeasors whose comparative fault is
often marginal. See Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J.
60 (July 1985) (analysis of a proposed California bill and a current survey of states
which have abolished or limited joint and several liability); Public Bodies Battle to
Limit Joint-and-Several Doctrine, LA. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at 24, col. 2; Those With
Money Pay Liability Suits, L.A. Times, Feb. 21, 1985, at 34, col. 1. This factor only
hints at the heart of the problem in our system of joint and several liability.
A case in trial at the time this comment is being written is illustrative. An anesthe-
siologist, whose malpractice had previously contributed to a patient's death, obtained
professional liability insurance with a $500,000 policy limit. This amount, considering
his specialty and past, was ridiculously low. A six-year-old boy suffered permanent
brain damage as a principal result of the anesthesiologist's malpractice. At the
mandatory settlement conference, plaintiff's counsel submitted an itemized list of past
and future special damages totaling nearly seven million dollars. Soon thereafter, on
the eve of trial, a 45 million dollar settlement demand was made. The plaintiff and the
anesthesiologist entered into a settlement, a release from all liability in exchange for
tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling
defendants. 75
Lower courts are given broad discretion to determine good faith
but must follow a rule of thumb in their case-by-case determinations:
"'[A] defendant's settlement figure must not be grossly dispropor-
tionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement,
would estimate the settling defendant's liability to be.' "76 The "at
time of settlement" language is important, for the policy of encourag-
ing settlement would be substantially impaired if the lower courts
were required to examine the settlement in any other context.77
The court further attempted to clarify the application of the rea-
sonable range test by way of example. It approved of the court's de-
cision in Widson v. International Harvester Co.78 Widson had the
same statute of limitations problem as that in Tech-Bilt, but unlike
Woodward-Clyde, the defendant in Widson paid plaintiff $30,000 in
settlement. The Tech-Bilt court quoted the Widson court's analysis
and agreed that the $30,000 payment represented a good faith
settlement:
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination the amount of
the settlement is in fact fair. Evaluations of Louetto's potential liability
ranged from zero to 10 percent of plaintiff's recovery. Counsel for Louetto ex-
pressed the view that in the worst case Louetto's exposure would tally 25 per-
cent. Evaluations of plaintiff's total recovery ranged from $200,000 to $750,000.
$500,000 - the policy limits. This payment was only 1/9 of the demand for settlement,
yet the anesthesiologist was the most culpable party. It was admitted that he had per-
sonal assets which could be used to cover any liability beyond the policy limits. Never-
theless, the superior court, relying primarily on the fact that full policy limits were
tendered, found the settlement to be in good faith. The Court of Appeal for the Sec-
ond District denied a petition for writ of mandate on the issue, even though section
877.6(e) specifically directs that this avenue of relief be pursued. Medical Center of
Tarzana v. Superior Court, 2d Civ. No. B015283 (filed July 23, 1985) (LASC No. NWC
91074, Diane Wayne presiding). The writ denial may be indicative of the appellate
court's reluctance to give the reasonable range level of review the teeth needed to ef-
fect any significant change. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
75. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
76. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 (quoting Torres V. Union Pac.
R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 509, 213 Cal. Rptr. 825, 832 (1984)).
77. Often settlement agreements are consummated before discovery is completed;
indeed, the future cost of litigation is one valid reason for settling a case. In such a
case, it would be unduly burdensome for the court to either speculate as to what fu-
ture discovery would unveil, or stay its decision of good faith until more discovery is
conducted.
The River Garden Farms case is in accord. "In advance of a jury verdict, most cases
permit only a rough assessment of value. When one tortfeasor chooses to settle and
another chooses to litigate, inequality in the ultimate cost does not signalize bad faith."
River Garden Farms, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
78. 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1984). This case, along with Kohn v.
Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1983), and Wysong & Miles Co.
v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d 278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983), were atypical
of recent court of appeal decisions in this area. Each court recognized the injustices
that were occurring at the hands of the "tortious conduct" rationale, so these cases un-
dertook an inquiry along the lines of a "reasonable range" test.
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In such a factual context, it cannot be said the $30,000 paid by Louetto was
unreasonable.
7 9
Tech-Bilt has ended the legal dogfight over the proper test for good
faith under Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6.80 Key
words such as "proportionality" and "ballpark" have replaced the
concept of tortious or collusive conduct. However, in the wake of this
resolution, the factual dogfights begin.
VI. THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE REASONABLE
RANGE TEST
From a procedural standpoint, nothing has changed. California
Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6(a) still entitles any party to a
hearing on the issue of good faith, provided notice is given at least
twenty days before the hearing.81 The party asserting lack of good
faith has the burden of proof on that issue.8 2 Any party aggrieved by
the lower court's determination may petition the proper court to re-
view the determination by writ of mandate.8 3
However, the Tech-Bilt decision made section 877.6(b) much more
crucial. That section provides: "The issue of the good faith of a set-
tlement may be determined by the court on the basis of affidavits
served with the notice of hearing, and any counteraffidavits filed in
response thereto, or the court may, in its discretion, receive other evi-
79. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 501, 698 P.2d at 168, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 265 (quoting Wid-
son v. International Harvester Co., 153 Cal. App. 3d 45, 58, 200 Cal. Rptr. 136, 145
(1984)). The case of Wysong & Miles Co. v. Western Indus. Movers, 143 Cal. App. 3d
278, 191 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1983), was also approved. The analysis followed in Tech-Bilt
and Widson was strongly advocated by Roberts, supra note 36, at 927.
80. Likewise, recovery agreements under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5 (West
1980) must pass the reasonable range test.
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1985). Fisher v. Superior Court,
103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 442-43, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 53 (1980), indicated that the issue of the
good faith settlement between the plaintiff and the settling tortfeasor should be tried
separately and in advance of the trial of the tort issues, and upon motion of any party
to the action should be tried as soon after the settlement as the court's calendar
permits.
82. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(d) (West Supp. 1985).
83. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(e) (West Supp. 1985). Note that under section
877.6(e)(2),
If the court grants a hearing on the writ, the hearing shall be given special
precedence over all other civil matters on the calendar of the court except
those matters to which equal or greater precedence on the calendar is granted
by law.
The running of any period of time after which an action would be subject to
dismissal pursuant to Section 583 shall be tolled during the period of review of
a determination pursuant to this subdivision.
Id.
dence at the hearing."8 4 It appears as though the issue of good faith
will be won or lost "in the trenches" by way of explicit affidavits and
declarations by counsel and experts at the "good faith" hearing.
Moreover, since the court has discretion to receive other evidence to
aid it in rendering a decision, the court's experience and interest
could make for unexpected requests at the hearing. Courts will, no
doubt, wish to fill the record with pertinent, favorable information so
as to insulate the decision from an unfavorable review on a writ pro-
ceeding. Those parties wishing to challenge the good faith of an
agreement must be prepared for the "mini-trial" against which Chief
Justice Bird has warned.8 5
Perhaps the relevant inquiry, in terms of the practical applications
of Tech-Bilt, is whether trial courts can survive under the burden of
more complex section 877 hearings, and whether appellate courts will
grant litigants' writ petitions arising from misapplications of the rea-
sonable range test. Thus far, however, it has been business as usual
in the trial and appellate courts. One case, Bolamperti v. Larco Man-
ufacturing,86 while dealing with the question of whether a settling
tortfeasor may pursue a cause of action for equitable indemnity
against a nonsettling tortfeasor,8 7 actually prioritized the goal of en-
couraging settlement over the goal of distributing fault equitably.88
Old dicta, it appears, will die a long, slow death in this area.
The potential for added and more extensive hearings and writ pro-
ceedings makes the Tech-Bilt decision an unpopular one with most
courts. Nonetheless, the supreme court has passed the torch to the
lower courts. Whether the lower courts will carry the spirit of Tech-
Bilt into their arena remains to be seen.
VII. TECH-BILT AND SLIDING SCALE RECOVERY AGREEMENTS
The Tech-Bilt case also redefined the standard by which sliding
scale recovery agreements are scrutinized. The reasonable range test,
as applied to these agreements, poses unique problems that must be
addressed, and are currently being addressed in both the appellate
courts and the supreme court. While there are patent differences
between sliding scale recovery agreements and other types of settle-
ment agreements, the key distinction between an ordinary settle-
84. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(6) (West Supp. 1985).
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86. 164 Cal. App. 3d 249, 210 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1985).
87. The court held that such a cause of action is permissible because the policy of
encouraging settlement "is not hindered by allowing the settling tortfeasor to pursue
its remedy .... In fact, the policy is enhanced." Id. at 255, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 159. See
also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester, Inc., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 262 (1978).
88. Bolamperti, 164 Cal. App. 3d at 252-53, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
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ment, such as the one in Tech-Bilt, and a sliding scale recovery
agreement, lies in the inherent problems of determining good faith
and placing a value on the guarantee given to the plaintiff. Before
these problems are addressed, however, it is necessary to become ac-
quainted with the mechanics and the history of the agreement in
California.
A sliding scale recovery agreement is defined in California Code of
Civil Procedure section 877.5(b) as follows:
An agreement or covenant between a plaintiff or plaintiffs and one or more,
but not all, alleged tortfeasor defendants, where the agreement limits the lia-
bility of the agreeing tortfeasor defendants to an amount which is dependent
upon the amount of recovery which the plaintiff is able to recover from the
nonagreeing defendant or defendants. This includes, but is not limited to,
agreements within the scope of Section 877, and agreements in the form of a
loan from the agreeing tortfeasor defendant to the plaintiff or plaintiffs which
is repayable in whole or in part from the recovery against the nonagreeing
tortfeasor defendant.8 9
Section 877.5 represented the legislature's attempt to clean-up the
so-called "Mary Carter" agreement.90 The typical Mary Carter
agreement has four essential features:
89. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877.5(b) (West 1980).
90. Mary Carter Agreements have been litigated often, and law reviews have de-
voted reams of paper to the subject. The term originated in the Florida case of Maule
Indus., Inc. v. Rountree, 264 So. 2d 445 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds, 284 So. 2d 389 (Fla. 1973). The court, upon reversal, referred to the case of
Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967). See also Breit-
kreutz v. Baker, 514 P.2d 17 (Alaska 1973); City of Tucson v. Gallagher, 108 Ariz. 140,
493 P.2d 1197 (1972); Pease v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 113 Cal. Rptr.
416 (1974); Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973); Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 61
Ill. 2d 513, :337 N.E.2d 23 (1975), cert. denied, Gatto v. Calumet Flexicore Corp., 425
U.S. 936 (1976); Burkett v. Crulo Trucking Co., 171 Ind. App. 166, 355 N.E.2d 253
(1976); General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980); Pacific In-
dem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1977); Lum v. Stinnett, 87
Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971); Bedford School Dist. v. Caron Constr. Co., 116 N.H. 800,
367 A.2d 1051 (1976); Cox v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 594 P.2d 354 (Okla. 1978); Degen v. Bay-
man, 86 S.D. 598, 200 N.W.2d 134 (1972); General Motors Corp. v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d
855 (Tex. 1977), overruled, Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984);
Vermont Union School Dist. v. H.P. Cummings Constr. Co., 143 Vt. 416, 469 A.2d 742
(1983); Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214 Wis. 210, 252 N.W. 675 (1934); Freedman, The
Expected Demise of 'Mary Carter: She Never Was Well!, 633 INS. L.J. 602 (1975); Note,
Are Gallagher Covenants Unethical?: An Analysis Under the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, 19 ARIz. L. REV. 863 (1977); Note, 'Mary Carter' Limitation on Liability
Agreements Between Adversary Parties: A Painted Lady is Exposed, 28 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 988 (1974); Note, The Mary Carter Agreement - Solving the Problems of Collu-
sive Settlement in Joint Tort Actions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1393 (1974); Comment, Slid-
ing Scale Agreements and the Good Faith Requirement of Settlement Negotiating, 12
PAC. L.J. 121 (1980); Comment, Mary Carter Agreements: A Viable Means of Settle-
ment? 14 TULSA L.J. 744 (1978-79); Annot., 65 A.L.R.3D 602 (1975).
1. The agreeing defendants must remain in the action in the pos-
ture of defendants;
2. The agreement must be kept secret;
3. The agreeing defendants guarantee to the plaintiff a certain
monetary recovery regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit;
4. The agreeing defendants' liability is decreased in direct propor-
tion to the increase in the nonagreeing defendants' liability.91
The opportunities for injustice abound with Mary Carter agree-
ments,92 and these agreements have been criticized as "champertous,
violative of public policy, and a distortion of the adversar[ial] rela-
tionship between plaintiffs and defendants which results in a collu-
sive proceeding adversely affecting the nonagreeing defendant's right
to a fair trial."93 Therefore, in order to alleviate part of the collusive
nature of the Mary Carter agreement, section 877.5 mandates that
the court be promptly informed of such an agreement. 94 It also re-
quired that if the settling tortfeasor is called as a witness at trial, the
jury be informed of the agreement.9 5 Although the element of se-
crecy has been eliminated from sliding scale recovery agreements in
California, an examination of a typical agreement reveals that the po-
tential for unfairness continues to exist.96
A typical sliding scale recovery agreement is set up as follows: The
plaintiff is guaranteed a certain amount by one of the joint tortfeasor
defendants in a lawsuit as a "settlement." If plaintiff recovers a sum
91. Vermont Union School Dist. v. H.P. Cummings Constr. Co., 142 Vt. 416, 427,
469 A.2d 742, 748 (1983).
92. Indeed, some jurisdictions prohibit Mary Carter agreements entirely. See, e.g.,
Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347 (1971); Trampe v. Wisconsin Tel. Co., 214
Wis. 210, 252 N.W. 675 (1934).
93. Cummings, 143 Vt. at 428, 469 A.2d at 749. See Grillo v. Burke's Paint Co., 275
Or. 421, 426, 551 P.2d 449, 452 (1976). See also Lum v. Stinnett, 87 Nev. 402, 488 P.2d 347
(1971).
94. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(1) (West 1980) states, "The parties entering
into any such agreement or covenant shall promptly inform the court in which the ac-
tion is pending of the existence of the agreement or covenant and its terms and provi-
sions ......
95. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(2) (West 1980) states,
If the action is tried before a jury, and a defendant party to the agreement
is a witness, the court shall, upon motion of a party, disclose to the jury the
existence and content of the agreement or covenant, unless the court finds
that such disclosure will create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of con-
fusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.
The jury disclosure herein required shall be no more than necessary to be
sure that the jury understands (1) the essential nature of the agreement, but
not including the amount paid, or any contingency, and (2) the possibility that
the agreement may bias the testimony of the alleged tortfeasor or tortfeasors
who entered into the agreement.
Id.
96. Constitutional challenges to section 877.5 on the basis of due process and equal
protection grounds have been unsuccessful. See City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court,
vacated opinion at, 206 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1984), reh'g granted and case retransferred, 176
Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986).
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greater than the figure agreed upon, the guaranteeing defendant pays
nothing and, so long as the sliding scale agreement is determined to
be in good faith, 97 any claim for partial or comparative indemnity or
equitable comparative contribution against the settling defendant is
barred.98 If plaintiff recovers nothing at trial from the nonsettling
defendants, the guaranteed amount must be paid by the settling de-
fendant. If any portion of the guaranteed amount is recovered by
plaintiff at trial, the settling tortfeasor must pay the difference be-
tween that amount and the guaranteed amount. The settling
tortfeasor normally reserves the right to reject any settlement be-
tween plaintiff and any other tortfeasor,99 or the agreement contains
a contingency clause that renders the agreement null and void in the
event the plaintiff settles with a nonguaranteeing defendant. 00
There are variations on this theme, most notably "no interest loans"
paid to plaintiff by a settling defendant that are held not to be in
97. The good faith standard for sliding scale recovery agreements is identical to
that of any otler settlement agreement. Tech-Bilt has reaffirmed this rule. See supra
notes 42 and 6:3.
98. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1985). Note that a settling
tortfeasor may pursue a claim for equitable indemnity against a nonsettling tortfeasor
should he choose to do so. Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App. 3d 249, 255, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 155, 158-59 (1985).
99. See, e.g., Burlington N. R.R. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 376 (1982).
100. See, e.g, Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. W.H. Simpson Constr. Co., 171 Cal. App.
3d 781, 786-87, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, 572 (1985). The agreement in this case provided (in
pertinent part) as follows:
"FOR &ND IN CONSIDERATION of the sum of THREE HUNDRED
FIFTY THOUSAND & NO/100 ($350,000.00) [Exclusive of any Workers' Com-
pensation Lien], as a Guarantee against any verdict rendered against defend-
ant RIVERSIDE STEEL .... plaintiff, ROBERT E. SEWARD, ....
release[s] .. . WILLIAM H. SIMPSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, LIB-
ERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY .... from any and all claims, ac-
tions, causes of action .... which the undersigned now have or which may
hereafter accrue on account of . . .the accident, casualty or event which oc-
curred on the 11th day of September, 1978, at or near the Allstate Savings
building under construction in the City of Glendale ....
"Said guarantee is to operate as follows:
1. In the event plaintiff obtains a verdict against RIVERSIDE STEEL in
the amount of $350,000.00 or above, defendant SIMPSON will owe plaintiff
nothing;
2. In the event of a defense verdict in favor of RIVERSIDE STEEL and
against plaintiff, SIMPSON will pay plaintiff $350,000.00;
3. In the event of a verdict in favor of plaintiff SEWARD and against de-
good faith.101 As previously mentioned, upon entering into a binding
sliding scale recovery agreement,102 court notification is required.103
The potential for unfairness with such an agreement, with or with-
out legislative approval, is obvious.104 A clear example is when, by
the terms of the agreement, a settling party remains a defendant at
trial. 0 5 A defendant who enters into a sliding scale recovery agree-
ment and remains a party to vindicate his "professional reputation"
has an interest not in a defense verdict, but rather, in a plaintiff's
verdict in excess of the guaranteed amount, thereby protecting his
bank account.
Moreover, this settling defendant remains an ostensible adversary
of the plaintiff at trial even though there is no actual controversy re-
maining between the parties. Granted, if a settling defendant is
called as a witness, then the existence and content of the agreement
is disclosed to the jury.10 6 However, disclosing the agreement may
also send a message to the jury that there was in fact culpability on
the part of the defendants, thus impaling the nonsettling tortfeasor
on the horns of a dilemma. In addition, plaintiff may use leading
fendant, RIVERSIDE STEEL, in an amount less than $350,000.00, SIMPSON
will pay plaintiff the difference between the verdict and $350,000.00.
"Plaintiff is to dismiss, with prejudice, the complaint filed against SIMP-
SON, and each side to this agreement is to bear their own costs.
"The foregoing agreement is contingent on the following:
1. That the Court determine the above settlement to be in 'GOOD
FAITH';
2. That the Court order RIVERSIDE's cross-complaint against SIMPSON
dismissed in its entirety;
3. That in the event plaintiff chooses to settle with RIVERSIDE prior to a
verdict, for a sum less than $350,000.00, the above Guarantee becomes null and
void. SIMPSON may, at its option, attempt to settle with plaintiff for a sum
that will not exceed the difference between the settlement with RIVERSIDE
and $350,000.00;
4. In the event plaintiff chooses to settle with RIVERSIDE prior to a ver-
dict for the sum of $350,000.00, or above, defendant SIMPSON will pay
nothing."
Id.
101. See, e.g., Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 285-86, 212
Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (1985).
102. A finalized, unambiguous agreement is required to be presented for a determi-
nation of good faith. The settling party has the burden of proof on this issue. See
Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 449, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 57 (1980).
103. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(1) (West 1980).
104. It is clearly a mistake to assume that legislative action in the form of codifica-
tion of a statute is tacit approval of the status quo or unfairness. At times, a legislature
will attempt to merely improve the particular unfair situation. Therefore, arguments
in favor of Mary Carter agreements based on supposed legislative approval ignore the
reality of the situation. No statute is above reproach.
105. The nonsettling party in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App.
3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986), raised this argument, but the court rejected it. The
challenge was on due process grounds; a procedure that does not run afoul of due pro-
cess is not necessarily an equitable situation for a litigant.
106. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877.5(a)(2) (West 1980).
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questions in a direct examination of the settling defendant 07 and the
settling defendant receives a share of the nonsettling defendant's per-
emptory challenges under Code of Civil Procedure section 601.108 In
any event, if a settling defendant remains a party, the opportunities
for prejudice abound and the nature of the adversarial process is
distorted.
Even if the settling defendant does not remain a party in the ac-
tion, as is generally the case, the courts must still determine whether
the agreement was made in good faith.109 Before Tech-Bilt, courts of
appeal applied the same "tortious conduct"x10 test that had become
prevalent in all good faith determinations. 1 ' Only one pre-Tech-Bilt
case, Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad,112 deviated from that trend.
It is clear that the tortious conduct test was unsatisfactory in the slid-
ing scale recovery agreement context for the same reason it was un-
satisfactory under sections 877 and 877.6; the policy of settlement
dominated the policy of equitable distribution of fault.113 The case of
107. CAL. EVID. CODE § 776(a) (West Supp. 1985) provides: "[a] party to the record
of any civil action, or a person identified with such a party, may be called and ex-
amined as if under cross-examination by any adverse party at any time during the
presentation of evidence by the party calling the witness."
108. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 601 (West Supp. 1985). Section 601 provides:
Challenges; kinds; number of peremptory challenges
Challenges are to individual jurors and are either peremptory or for cause.
Each party is entitled to challenges for cause.
If there are only two parties, each party shall be entitled to ... six peremp-
tory challenges. If there are more than two parties, the court shall, for the
purpose of allotting peremptory challenges, divide the parties into two or
more sides according to their respective interests in the issues. Each side shall
be entitled to ... eight peremptory challenges. If there are several parties on
a side, the court shall divide the challenges among them as nearly equally as
possible ....
Id.
109. CAL. CIV. PROC..CODE § 877.6(a) (West Supp. 1985).
110. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.fr., Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212 Cal.
Rptr. 389 (1985); City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 160 Cal. App. 3d 489, 206 Cal.
Rptr. 674 (1984), on retranfer to 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562 (1986); Bur-
lington N. R.R. Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982);
Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1981). Compare
Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984). The Torres
court cited River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 998, 103
Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1972), as controlling, and fashioned a standard for determining
good faith along the lines of Tech-Bilt. Tech-Bilt cited Torres with approval. Tech-Bilt,
38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264. In the future, courts scrutiniz-
ing sliding scale recovery agreements must perform an analysis similar to that of
Torres.
112. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
113. See supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
Burlington Northern Railroad v. Superior Court 1 4 is illustrative.
In Burlington, an off-duty employee of Burlington was paralyzed
when the door of a refrigeration car, owned by Burlington and manu-
factured by Paccar, Inc., fell on him. Burlington and plaintiff entered
into a settlement agreement whereby plaintiff was guaranteed $2
million at the end of all litigation. 1 5 Paccar did not settle. Paccar
challenged the good faith of the settlement, and the lower court
found the settlement not to be in good faith because "it both ignored
equitable apportionment and failed to promote settlement of litiga-
tion."16 The appellate court was mindful of the fact that if plaintiff
received a judgment over $2 million against Paccar at trial, an osten-
sibly culpable tortfeasor, Burlington, would pay nothing to plaintiff
by the terms of the agreement. Also, Paccar would not receive partial
indemnity from Burlington if the agreement was determined to be in
good faith.117 However, the court stated that "[t]he settling parties
are only bound to refrain from tortious or other wrongful conduct
against the nonsettling parties."1 8 Because no tortious conduct was
evident in the case, the agreement was considered to be in good faith.
Tech-Bilt, while expressly dealing with basic settlements under sec-
tions 877 and 877.6, implicitly dealt with sliding scale recovery agree-
ments. The Burlington decision was disapproved in a footnote,11 9
and in the context of sliding scale recovery agreements, the tortious
conduct test was abandoned for the reasonable range test. 20
VIII. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS IN DETERMINING THE GOOD FAITH OF
A SLIDING SCALE RECOVERY AGREEMENT UNDER THE
REASONABLE RANGE TEST.' 2 '
While the supreme court in Tech-Bilt has determined that the rea-
sonable range test will apply to sliding scale recovery agreements
under California Code of Civil Procedure section 877.5,122 the court
114. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982).
115. Id. at 944, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377. The agreement prevented plaintiff from set-
tling with Paccar for less than $2 million without Burlington's consent, and it required
Burlington to pay the difference between $2 million and the actual amount recovered
by plaintiff against Paccar. Note that no minimum payment was contemplated and ap-
parently no money was exchanged between plaintiff and Burlington. Id&
116. Id. at 944, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 377. This case is another example of the trial court
comporting with the spirit of Code of Civil Procedure sections 877.5 and 877.6 and the
appellate court disagreeing. See supra note 53.
117. Id. at 947, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
118. Id. at 946, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
119. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 500 n.7, 698 P.2d at 167 n.7, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264 n.7.
120. Id. at 500, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
121. The authors would like to acknowledge the input of Alan G. Martin, a partner
in the law firm of Greines, Martin, Stein and Richland, Beverly Hills, California. His
ideas form the basis for much of the remainder of this comment.
122. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263. This rule has
been followed in Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal.
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has yet to address the practical problems inherent in determining
good faith in the sliding scale recovery agreement context.1 23 The
problem is clear: the actual amount of the recovery from the settlor
can "slide" anywhere from zero to possibly millions of dollars. Be-
cause one of the factors used to determine good faith under the rea-
sonable range test is the amount paid in the settlement,124 a court
attempting to determine the good faith of a sliding scale recovery
agreement before trial 125 is faced with the unenviable task of deter-
mining the good faith of an agreement that could allow the guarantor
to walk away scott free or sting the guarantor for millions. There are
only two cases that address this issue in the context discussed by
Tech-Bilt.
The first case, Torres v. Union Pacific Railroad,126 was cited with
approval in Tech-Bilt.127 In Torres, a Union Pacific Railroad (herein-
after Union) employee sustained personal injuries while operating a
bumper jack borrowed from Union. The defendants in the case were
Union and Hallman, the manufacturer. An agreement was reached
between plaintiff and Union whereby Union paid $200,000 to plain-
tiff; $50,000 was an outright settlement and the additional $150,000
was to be repaid to Union in the event that plaintiff recovered at
least $150,000 from Hallman. In essence, plaintiff was guaranteed
$200,000 by Union. Ultimately, plaintiff also settled with Hallman for
$300,000. This made plaintiff's total recovery $350,000: $300,000 from
Hallman and $50,000 from Union. Hallman, contending that the
$50,000 settlement between plaintiff and Union was too low to with-
stand good faith scrutiny, challenged the agreement between plaintiff
and Union.
The Torres court declined to follow Burlington Northern Railroad
Rptr. 605 (1985), petition for review granted, No. B007911 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985),
and City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 856, 222 Cal. Rptr. 562
(1986).
123. As a rcent case has stated, "The law is not yet settled . . . as to what stan-
dards are to be used by the trial court in determining the good faith of a sliding scale
recovery agreement." Riverside Steel Constr. Co. v. William H. Simpson Constr. Co.,
171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 795, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569, 578 (1985), petition for review granted,
No. B006676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985).
124. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
125. This is the time the determination must be made. "[P]ractical considerations
obviously requre that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at
the time of settlement." Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
264.
126. 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984).
127. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 167, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
v. Superior Court.128 The court, reasoning that "the price of a de-
fendant's settlement bears some relationship to the merits and values
of the case against that defendant,"129 held that Union's guarantee
"was [a] fair settlement of Union's dispute with Torres."130 To deter-
mine the fairness of this figure, the court examined the potential lia-
bilities of the parties. The facts indicated that Hallman's liability was
clearer than Union's.
Moreover, the court indicated that
where the settlement involves no tortious conduct or motive, the policy of
promoting settlements will be indulged; any moderate disparity between a de-
fendant's settlement price and his fair share of the damages will be tolerated,
and the good faith requirement will cause the balance to tip in favor of
settlement.1
3 1
This policy of erring in favor of settlement is consistent with Tech-
Bilt's "in the ballpark" standard and helps to keep the policies of eq-
uity and settlement counterbalanced.132 It also aids the courts that
are charged with determining good faith at the pre-trial stage of the
case.
The Torres case is helpful to courts and to future litigants in that it
presents a methodology approved by Tech-Bilt for determining good
faith in the context of a sliding-scale recovery agreement. Nonethe-
less, it is disturbing in that the court could, and did, ultimately fall
back on the $50,000 actually paid to the plaintiff. The Torres case, for
all practical purposes, merely begged the question as to what is a
good faith sliding scale recovery agreement, especially when the set-
tling defendant has made no minimum payment to the plaintiff.
The recent case of Riverside Steel Construction Co. v. William H.
Simpson Construction Co.,133 decided after Tech-Bilt, also dealt with
the problem of the good faith determination of a sliding scale recov-
ery agreement. In Riverside, a union worker fell from the eighth
floor of a building under construction. Plaintiff sued, among others,
the general contractor, Simpson, and the subcontractor, Riverside.
Plaintiff and Simpson entered into a sliding scale recovery agreement
128. 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982). See supra notes 114-19 and ac-
companying text for a discussion of Burlington.
129. Torres, 157 Cal. App. 3d at 508, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The Torres court leveled
the same criticism at Cardio Systems and Burlington that the court in Tech-Bilt did:
"[t]he Cardio Systems and Burlington decisions go astray by ignoring the accommodat-
ing role of the good faith requirement and by adopting, albeit under protest, the unde-
sirable extreme of promoting settlement at all costs. This error is founded upon an
unreasonably narrow definition of the term good faith." Id. at 506, 203 Cal. Rptr. at
830.
130. Id. at 509, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
131. Id. at 506, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
132. Id. Accord Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499-501, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
263-64.
133. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985), petition for review granted, No.
B006676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985).
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which guaramteed plaintiff $350,000,134 but which did not call for a
minimum payment to plaintiff. Riverside challenged the agreement
as not being in good faith in light of Tech-Bilt.135
The Riverside court acknowledged that the Tech-Bilt reasonable
range test was to be applied in the context of sliding scale recovery
agreements, but admitted that the method of applying the test was
undetermined.1 3 6 Nevertheless, the court made three important de-
terminations in this area. First, the court held that no minimum pay-
ment is required as a matter of law in order to find a sliding scale
recovery agreement to be in good faith.
Because the determination of whether it was in good faith requires the bal-
ancing of several factors among which but one is the total value of the agree-
ment and not just focusing on the fact that Simpson did not unconditionally
commit itself to pay a minimum unconditional amount of money, we conclude
that Simpson's failure to do so does not render the sliding scale recovery
agreement a bad faith agreement as a matter of law.1 3
7
In Riverside, two trial judges valued plaintiff's case at $350,000 - the
ceiling amount of the agreement. However, because the nonsettling
tortfeasor failed to raise proportionality at the trial level, the court
did not consider that issue in light of the possibility that the guaran-
tor may escape the mandate of California Code of Civil Procedure
section 877.5 without paying a cent.1 3 8 Moreover, the legislature en-
acted section 877.5 without such a minimum payment requirement;
therefore, no such requirement is necessary.
Second, the court stated that good faith need not be determined by
134. For the full text of the agreement, see supra note 100.
135. Riverside, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 792, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 576. The supreme court
could characterize much of the appellate court's discussion of sliding scale recovery
agreements as dicta, because the court ultimately decided the case on the issue of Riv-
erside's failure to meet its burden of proof. Id. at 797, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
136. Id. at 795, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
137. Id. at 797-98, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 579. See also Rogers & Wells v. Superior Court,
175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 552-53, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767, 773-74 (1985).
138. This factor is also important in determining the value of the agreement. See
infra note 159 and accompanying text. The court indicated that the nonsettling party
must do more than merely object to the agreement:
[A]n important additional factor which should be considered in determining
the good 1faith of a settlement or sliding scale recovery agreement is what
amount of money the party objecting to the determination of good faith then
sets as the total value of the injured plaintiff's case for settlement purposes is,
and what atmount of money that party then stands ready to contribute toward
an overall settlement.
Riverside, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 798, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80 (emphasis in original). See
also Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 449, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47, 57 (1980);
Rogers & Wells v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 553-54, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767, 773
(1985).
looking only at the minimum payment the settling tortfeasor would
be obligated to pay.139 Rather, "the settlor's proportionate share of
liability [is but] one factor in determining whether a settlement is in
good faith."140 To contend otherwise would create a floor on the set-
tling tortfeasors liability while leaving an open ceiling. Such a deter-
mination would unduly discourage settlements.
Third, the court reiterated the proposition alluded to in Pease v.
Beech Aircrcft Corp.,141 that "a sliding scale recovery agreement
which does not provide for an unconditional minimum payment does
not constitute a settlement unless a value is ascribed to the giving of
the guarantee." 142
The Riverside court reasoned that if no consideration passed from
settlor to plaintiff, and if a judgment is rendered against the nonset-
thing defendant, then the nonsettling defendant has no dollar amount
to claim as an offset against the "settlement" between plaintiff and
settlor.143 The so-called "settlement" between plaintiff and the guar-
antor is not evidenced by monies changing hands. For this reason,
the Riverside court considered the agreement between plaintiff and
Simpson not to be a settlement.
The court hinted at an alternative to leaving the nonsettling
tortfeasor holding the entire bag, but did not pursue the analysis.
The petition for hearing to the supreme court in this case was
granted, and perhaps that court will take the opportunity to answer
the question yet to be meaningfully addressed in California - the
question of if and how the guarantee given to plaintiff by the guaran-
tor should be valued.144
A. Valuation of the Guarantee
In the most practical terms, valuing the guarantee given in a slid-
ing scale recovery agreement amounts to affixing a premium to a pol-
icy of insurance. That is, plaintiff, in exchange for a guaranteed
139. Riverside, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577.
140. Id. See also Rogers & Wells, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 554, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 773 ("Pe-
titioners have taken a simplistic approach by saying that because the sliding scale
agreements could result in no liability, they have no value.").
141. 38 Cal. App. 3d 450, 473, 113 Cal. Rptr. 416, 431-32 (1974).
142. Riverside, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 795, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 578.
143. Id. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980) entitles the nonsettling
tortfeasor to offset the judgment in plaintiff's favor by the amount paid in settlement
by other tortfeasors. But see infra note 146 and accompanying text.
144. Note that a rehearing has recently been completed in the case of Abbott Ford,
Inc., v. Superior Court, 166 Cal. App. 3d 280, 212 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1985). See Abbott
Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (Abbott Ford II), 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605
(1985), petition for review granted, No. B007911 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985). While
the court ostensibly applied the Tech-Bilt reasonable range test during rehearing, and
once again held the agreement to be in good faith, no discussion of the valuation of the
agreement was undertaken.
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amount of recovery, agrees to dismiss his case against the guarantee-
ing tortfeasor. Thus, the risk of no recovery has been eliminated.
For this risk elimination, plaintiff necessarily must pay a price. The
soundness of the argument that a value should be placed on such a
guarantee, for reasons of equity, is clear. Plaintiffs unhesitantly ad-
mit that the primary purpose behind these agreements is "to obtain
assurance that grievous permanent injuries will be compensated and
to mitigate the uncertainities of the litigation process and the
debilitating emotional drain which [their] case inflicts upon
[them]."' 45 For this assurance and peace of mind, fairness and equity
dictate that the amount of judgment rendered against the nonsettling
tortfeasors be offset by the value of the guarantee as determined by
the court.
The argument that any amount in a sliding scale recovery agree-
ment is too speculative to be valued is without merit. The value of
the guaraLtee is the gravamen of the determination of good faith
under the reasonable range test for sliding scale recovery agree-
ments. If the value is speculative for valuation purposes, then it must
also be speculative for determining good faith; hence, any guarantee
that is too speculative to be valued must also fail the Tech-Bilt rea-
sonable range test of good faith. Therefore, the arguments asserted
by opponents of valuation, if true, ironically would be the death knell
of the entire good faith determination of such agreements.
46
Moreover, there is no statutory dissonance created by such a valua-
tion. On the contrary, California Code of Civil Procedure section
877(a) provides that a settlement agreement, including a sliding scale
recovery agreement, "shall reduce the claims against the other [non-
settling tortfeasors] in the amount stipulated by the release, the dis-
missal or the covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid
for it whichever is the greater."47
The court in Riverside Steel Construction Co. v. William H. Simp-
145. Abbott Ford, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 285, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 392 (emphasis added).
See also City of Los Angeles, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
146. Likewise, if a sliding scale recovery agreement is not a "settlement" at all, see
supra notes 141-43, then it is both semantically and logically impossible for a "settle-
ment in good faith" to occur under these circumstances as per Code of Civil Procedure
section 877 and 877.6. While this result is the desired one, if the courts are unwilling to
value the guarantee and offset against any judgment obtained by the plaintiff, such a
finding ignores the plain language at section 877 and the analysis. See infra note 147
and accompanying text.
147. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West 1980) (emphasis added).
son Construction CO.148 recognized the soundness of this argument:
The value of the guarantee is obviously worth a determinable amount as is
perhaps best illustrated in the analogous situation where a person buys liabil-
ity insurance and is willing to pay a 'premium' to have the insurance company
agree to discharge his legal liability or to indemnify him in the event of a loss.
That agreement of the insurance company has a large value to the insured for
which he is willing to pay a premium even though he realizes that the
probabilities are that the insurance company will not have to pay anything to
discharge its responsibility to him in any given policy year.1 4 9
In addition, because the value of the guarantee is the primary con-
sideration passing between the plaintiff and the guarantor tortfeasor
for valuation purposes when there is no minimum payment, 5 0 the
determination of good faith is inextricably tied to the value assigned
to the guarantee. It is clear that when the court attempts to deter-
mine whether a sliding scale recovery agreement is entered into in
good faith, a two step process must be undertaken. First, the court
must value the guarantee, and second, the court must determine
whether the value assigned to the guarantee satisfies the reasonable
range test of Tech-Bilt.
No case in California has attempted to place a specific dollar figure
on a sliding scale recovery agreement as of yet. However, the reason-
able range test has provided the appellate courts with sufficient
guidelines to do so.11 Tech-Bilt recognized numerous factors which
should be balanced in arriving at a reasonable range, and ultimately,
a determination of good faith.152 However, the court must consider
three factors in the context of sliding scale recovery agreements: 1)
the amount guaranteed in relation to the aggregate value of plain-
tiff's case;' 5 3 2) the proportionate liability of the guarantor in relation
148. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985). A petition for hearing to the
Supreme Court was granted in this case on December 19, 1985. See also Rogers &
Wells, 125 Cal. App. 3d at 553-54, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 773.
149. Riverside Steel, 171 Cal. App. 3d at 794, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 577. Accord Rogers &
Wells, 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1985).
150. Another form of consideration possible in a sliding scale recovery agreement is
the interest and origination fees associated with loans in a typical loan transaction.
Sliding scale recovery agreements in the past have provided for no-interest loans to
plaintiff from the guarantor tortfeasor. See Abbott Ford, 166 Cal. App. 3d at 286, 212
Cal. Rptr. at 392. Had plaintiff pursued the same loans in the ordinary financial mar-
ketplace, depending upon the credit risk, the interest and origination fees could
amount to a substantial sum, provided, of course, a lender is found. These amounts
could be valued, and offset against any judgment rendered against a nonsettling
tortfeasor. The I.R.S. has recognized the concept of imputed interest in other circum-
stances. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7872 (West Supp. 1985).
151. It is becoming increasingly clear that appellate courts are unwilling to adhere
to the spirit of Tech-Bilt in determining good faith. A very recent example is Abbott
Ford II, 172 Cal. App. 3d 675, 218 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1985). In this case, the court ostensi-
bly conducted a Tech-Bilt analysis of a sliding scale recovery agreement, but ignored
any valuation issue. The supreme court has granted review of the case.
152. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263-64.
153. This factor has been adapted from Tech-Bilt to fit the unique nature of sliding
scale recovery agreements. See id.
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to all tortfeasors; 154 and 3) the plaintiff's overall likelihood of success
in obtaining a judgment against all defendants. 155 These three fac-
tors must be weighted separately in light of the facts of a given case.
While one factor may weigh heavily enough to make up for another
that is weak, in general, a single strong factor should never be suffi-
cient if there are two that are weak. A brief evaluation of the three
factors will make their proposed application clear.
The amount guaranteed in relation to the total value of plaintiff's
case is determined first by valuing the plaintiff's case as against all
tortfeasors and then comparing it to the ceiling amount guaranteed
by the guarantor. In terms of good faith, the closer the guaranteed
amount approaches the estimated total value of plaintiff's case, the
stronger the argument that the agreement is in good faith. Thus, if
$3 million is guaranteed and plaintiff's case is valued at $3 million,
then this individual factor points strongly in favor of a good faith de-
termination. 156 However, as already stated, no one factor, should be
able to satisfy the reasonable range test.15 7
154. This factor is identical to the factor enunciated in Tech-Bilt for use in deter-
mining good faith in traditional settlement agreements. Id. See also Rogers & Wells,
175 Cal. App. 3d at 553, 220 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73 (the court recognized this factor in its
analysis).
155. This factor was not mentioned in the Tech-Bilt opinion, but it is essential to a
good faith evaluation procedure in the context of sliding scale recovery agreements.
Clearly, the value of a guarantee when liability is conclusive against the remaining
tortfeasors is much less than if the liability is doubtful against the remaining
tortfeasors. Since obtaining assurance of recovery and mitigating uncertainties is a pri-
mary motivation for plaintiffs in entering into sliding scale recovery agreements (see
supra note 145 and accompanying text), the absence of this factor from a good faith
determination eliminates a very important aspect of the consideration for which non-
settling tortfeasors are entitled to offset. The valuation procedure cannot ignore this
crucial factor.
156. From a practical standpoint, it would be very unlikely that a guarantor would
agree to guarantee a sum tremendously in excess of the total estimated amount of
plaintiff's case. Therefore, it is assumed that a guarantee equal to the total value of
plaintiff's case is the strongest this factor can be.
157. A diversion into logic will prove this point. If each of the three factors deline-
ated in the text ((1) the amount guaranteed in relation to the estimated value of the
case (or, for simplicity, AG); (2) the proportionate fault of the guarantor (PF); and (3)
the plaintiff's likelihood of success as against all defendants (LS)) were quantified
ranging from 1 to 10 in any given case, then each and every combination of factors and
quantification could be represented by a truth table of sorts to arrive at a numerical
representation of the amount of good faith in every conceivable sliding scale recovery
agreement. As to the numbers assigned, one would represent the situation when an
individual factor was least likely in good faith (i.e., when the ratio of the amount guar-
anteed to the estimated value of the case is low; when the proportionate fault of the
guarantor is high; when the likelihood of plaintiff's success is high) and ten would rep-
resent the situation when an individual factor was most likely in good faith (i.e., when
the amount guaranteed equals the estimated value of the case; when the proportionate
The proportionate liability of the guarantor in relation to all
tortfeasors is measured on a percentage basis. The nearer the pro-
portionate liability of the guarantor gets to 100%, the argument that
the guarantee is in good faith becomes weaker. This is because the
policy of distributing fault equitably, a policy reprioritized by Tech-
fault of the guarantor is low; when the likelihood of plaintiff's success is low) and six
would represent the middle of these extremes.
AG PF LS TOTAL
t H=10 H=I H=I 12
ttt H=10 H=1 M=6 17
* H=I0 H=l L=I0 21
H=10 M=6 H=1 17
H=10 M=6 M=6 22
* H=10 M=6 L=10 26
* H=10 L=10 H=1 21
H=10 L=10 M=6 26
** H=10 L=10 L=10 30
t M=6 H=I H=I 8
M=6 H=1 M=6 13
M=6 H=1 L=10 17
M=6 M=6 H=1 13
M=6 M=6 M=6 18
M=6 M=6 L=10 22
* M=6 L=10 L=10 26
tt L=1 H=l H=l 3
t L=I H=l M=6 8
t L=i H=1 L=10 12
t L=1 M=6 H=1 8
L=1 M=6 M=6 13
L=1 M=6 L=10 17
t L=I L=10 H=1 12
L=1 L=10 M=6 17
* L=1 L=10 L=10 21
* these cases have two of the three factors on the end of the scale that
indicate good faith.
t these cases have two of the three factors on the end of that scale that
indicate lack of good faith.
** this case received the highest rating in favor of good faith.
tt this case received lowest rating in favor of good faith.
The chart indicates that if each of the three factors are weighed in equal proportion to
one another, and if any two factors are strong, then the value of the recovery agree-
ment should be in the Tech-Bilt "ballpark." Conversely, if any two of the factors are
weak, then the value of the recovery agreement should never lie in the Tech-Bilt
"ballpark." Reality bears out these results. The strongest factual scenario in favor of
good faith (represented as **) is one in which the amount guaranteed is the estimated
value of plaintiff's case, the proportionate fault of the guarantor as against all defend-
ants is low, and the likelihood of success as against all defendants is high. The weakest
factual scenario is one in which the amount guaranteed to plaintiff is low as compared
to the value of plaintiff's case, the proportionate fault of the guarantor is high, and the
plaintiff's likelihood of success is high. Courts would have no trouble finding the for-
mer in good faith and placing a high value on such a guarantee, but courts would have
trouble finding the latter to be in good faith. Most cases are not this extreme, however,
so a realistic rule of thumb for the courts would be to find any agreement with two
strong factors to be in good faith, and to find any agreement with two weak factors not
to be in good faith.
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Bilt, cannot be satisfied if, for example, a 90% at fault tortfeasor
makes a guarantee that a judgment will be had against a 10% at fault
tortfeasor.158 Viewed conversely, the lower the estimated percentage
of fault of the guarantor, the stronger this factor appears to satisfy
good faith. This was precisely the case in Rogers & Wells v. Superior
Court.159 It is offensive to the most basic notions of fundamental
fairness that a tortfeasor who knows he was the primary cause of the
plaintiff's injury should be permitted to guarantee a recovery against
a tortfeasor whose culpability is grossly out of proportion to his own
and not be required to pay a substantial up-front cash settlement in
addition to the guarantee.
The plaintiff's overall likelihood of success as against all
tortfeasors, like the proportionate liabilities of the tortfeasors, is an
estimate made by parties in all types of tort cases. In terms of valua-
tion, it is clear that the value of the guarantee is influenced by the
plaintiff's likelihood of success. A guarantee in a case where liability
is questionable or even negligible, is worth much more to the plain-
tiff than is a guarantee in a case where liability is conclusive. Hence,
as the likelihood of plaintiff's success rises, the value of the guaran-
tee diminishes. Therefore, this factor cannot be overlooked by a
court in either determining good faith or valuing the guarantee. 160
These three factors interact in any given case so as to make no two
cases alike. Burlington Northern Railroad v. Superior Court is a
good example. 16 1 Burlington guaranteed plaintiff $2 million at the
end of all litigation. In order to properly analyze the good faith of
the guarantee in light of Tech-Bilt, the court would have to first de-
termine whether the value of the Burlington guarantee was within
the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor's proportional share of
comparative liability for the plaintiff's injuries. To arrive at a dollar
158. While no one of the three factors by itself should be the death knell of a slid-
ing scale recovery agreement, this 90% guarantor and 10% remaining tortfeasor scena-
rio is most often played out in reality by an underinsured 90% culpable tortfeasor and
a deep pocket 10% tortfeasor. Such a situation should be frowned upon due to Tech-
Bilt's stated policy of promoting equitable distribution of fault. At the very least, this
situation would also require a substantial cash payment in addition to the guarantee.
159. 175 Cal. App. 3d 545, 220 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1985) (sliding scale recovery agree-
ment entered into by defendants whose proportionate liability was low and the amount
guaranteed was $2.4 million was in good faith).
160. Exact proportions or percentages cannot be placed on these factors with
pinpoint precision. However, courts should be in favor of settlement to compensate for
the potential inconclusiveness. See supra note 132, 154, and accompanying text. Nev-
ertheless, each of the three factors must be carefully considered.
161. 133 Cal. App. 3d 942, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376 (1982). See supra notes 114-18 and ac-
companying 'text.
figure for this value the court would have to consider: 1) the propor-
tionate fault of Burlington (PF); 2) the amount of the guarantee in
relation to the estimated total value of plaintiff's case (AG); and
3) the likelihood of plaintiff's success against all tortfeasors (LS).
Note once again that courts would rather err in favor of settlements
when there is a moderate disparity between the value of the guaran-
tee and the guarantor tortfeasor's proportional fault.162 Suppose
that, as in the Riverside163 case, two judges experienced in settle-
ment valuation viewed the Burlington case as being worth $2 million
to plaintiffs (AG factor high), and that Burlington's proportional
fault was estimated to be 10% (PF factor low), and that a judgment
against Paccar was reasonably possible (LS factor medium).164 In
this case, to find the agreement to be in good faith, the court would
have to find the value of the agreement to be "in the ballpark" of
$200,000.165
Such a determination would be likely, since Burlington (in this hy-
pothetical) is only 10% at fault (PF factor low), and the guaranteed
total recovery of $2 million is accurate (AG factor high); thus it satis-
fies the rule of thumb that if two factors are strong, then the agree-
ment should be determined to be in good faith. A reasonable value
for this guarantee of $150,000166 would be possible in this case, and
the sliding scale recovery agreement, with no minimum payment,
would be in good faith under the reasonable range test of Tech-Bilt.
The result for the nonsettling defendant would be an offset of
$150,000 (this was the predetermined good faith valuation of the
guarantee), regardless of the judgment amount in plaintiff's favor.
Should the plaintiff lose, the guaranteeing tortfeasor must pay plain-
tiff two million dollars.
162. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. Of course, what constitutes a
"moderate disparity" actually depends on the nature of the case and the disposition of
the judge deciding the issue.
163. 171 Cal. App. 3d 781, 217 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1985), petition for review granted, No.
B006676 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1985).
164. See supra note 156. This scenario is represented by the symbols *** on the
chart. Note that, according to the chart, this scenario is in good faith.
165. The court, when ascertaining the value of the guarantee, should be permitted
to consider intangibles such as the particular economic condition of plaintiff and plain-
tiff's attorney, the overall experience and desire on the part of plaintiff's attorney to
settle the case to avoid trial, and the guarantor's financial position, vis-a-vis insurance
coverage and general economic health. The reason is clear: the value of the guarantee
may be adjusted upward if a party to the agreement demonstrates an unusual need to
settle. Of course, the conduct of the parties must not approach the level of fraud, col-
lusion or other tortious conduct. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. For exam-
ple, some plaintiff's lawyers in a given case would rather have a $5 million sliding scale
recovery agreement from a tortfeasor than an outright settlement of $1 million. Does
this mean that the value of the guarantee is $1 million?
166. The $150,000 figure is chosen arbitrarily to illustrate how the Tech-Bilt
"ballpark" comes into play.
[Vol. 13: 823, 1986] California Code of Civil Procedure
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
It would. be wise for a cautious plaintiff and settlor to pre-assign a
value to the guarantee at the time of its inception, so as to make the
trial court"s job easier and to avoid future conflicts. 167 A sliding scale
recovery agreement with a pre-assigned value requires only that the
trial judge determine if that value is within the Tech-Bilt ballpark
under the 877.6 analysis instead of applying the necessary valuation
analysis. Moreover, this value assigned to the parties will not be per
se unfair to the nonsettling defendant because the plaintiff and the
settlor have conflicting interests as to the amount for which the guar-
antee is to be valued. The plaintiff will negotiate for a low-side valu-
ation, because the value assigned to the guarantee will be offset
dollar for dollar against any plaintiff's judgment under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 877 and 877.6. The settlor, on the other hand,
wants the value to be on the high side, so as to ensure a finding of
good faith at the hearing, without which the settlor is left exposed to
a suit for partial equitable indemnity by the nonsettling defendant
under section 877. The tension between the two ought to promote
fairness in. the agreed value and streamline the valuation procedure.
The nonsettling defendant under these circumstances, may chal-
lenge the amount guaranteed as not being within the Tech-Bilt
ballpark and present evidence that its value should be much
higher16S (remember, whatever value the guarantee is assigned is the
amount of' offset to which the nonsettlor is entitled). In the alterna-
tive, the nonsettlor may accept the value assigned but argue that this
agreement does not satisfy the good faith standards deliniated in
Tech-Bilt. This broader challenge is much more risky since the trial
courts will be looking for evidence of lack of good faith.
It is clear from the analysis that not all guarantors will be able to
escape without a minimum payment. Suppose that Burlington was
estimated to be 90% at fault rather than only 10% (PF now high).
The valuation of the agreement, in order to be in good faith, must be
"in the ballpark" of $1.8 million. 6 9 In this case, a guarantee for $2
million with no minimum payment would be far from the type of
167. A court could interpret this requirement to be mandatory in this context be-
cause the settlor has the initial burden of showing there has been a settlement. See
supra notes 102, 143, and accompanying text.
168. See zupra note 138. This scenario is typical of a case in which an underinsured
tortfeasor and a deep-pocket tortfeasor (e.g., a municipality) are involved as defend-
ants. It is also the clearest case for requiring a substantial payment in addition to the
guarantee.
169. See aupra note 156. This scenario is represented by the symbols (ttt) on the
chart. Note that this scenario, according to the chart, fails the good faith test.
guarantee required under the reasonable range test, especially if
plaintiff's likelihood of success against the remaining defendant is
high.170 More likely than not, a sliding scale recovery agreement
would be inappropriate for this defendant.171
The result of applying this method of valuing guarantees made by
settling tortfeasors would be to discourage unfair sliding scale recov-
ery agreements. Discouraging unfair sliding scale recovery agree-
ments was the purpose behind the enactment of section 877.5; but
that section only addressed the tip of the iceberg. The valuation sys-
tem proposed in this comment would bring about significant changes
both in terms of fairness and the potential use of this mode of set-
tling lawsuits. Any requiem for the defense of unfair sliding scale re-
covery agreements would be a forgotten melody when compared to
the overture of equity in valuing the guarantee fairly. However, the
future of this type of agreement may be in doubt if courts mandate
the valuation scheme. All the intangibles relating to valuation and
offset could discourage tortfeasors from gambling against the sub-
stantial risk that equity courts, in hearings on good faith, will force
them to pay a fair price for the peace of mind purchased in a sliding
scale recovery agreement. Nonetheless, it is better to promote fair-
ness between all litigants than to allow culpable tortfeasors to gam-
ble at a nonsettlor's expense.
IX. CONCLUSION
Tech-Bilt has answered many questions in the area of settlements
between multiple tortfeasors. The schism in the appellate courts in
California has been mended, and in the wake of the confusion, the
reasonable range test has appeared once again. It is unclear at this
juncture what the trial courts and the appellate courts will do with
the test. Previous case law was indicative that the policy of encourag-
ing settlement and the tortious conduct test were favored by those
courts because of advantages in expedited litigation and ease in appli-
cation. It is also unclear whether the good faith determination hear-
ings will become the mini-trials that Chief Justice Bird predicted
they would become. In essence, though the law has been settled, the
practical application of the reasonable range test has yet to gel.
The sliding scale recovery agreement has been affected dramati-
cally by Tech-Bilt. But the key to a good faith determination of such
an agreement lies in the valuation of the guarantee between the
170. See supra note 156. This scenario is the first line of the chart. Note that with
two weak factors, a good faith determination is not possible under the rule of thumb.
171. There are other imaginable cases which would present far more difficult
problems from an analytic standpoint. Such cases are those not designated by a * or a
t on the chart. See supra note 156. When courts are faced with these situations, other
factors mentioned in Tech-Bilt could tip the balance one way or the other.
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plaintiff and the guarantor tortfeasor, a subject yet to be addressed
by the supreme court. Though courts will err in favor of settlement
in all cases, a diligent valuation effort by the trial court or by the set-
tling parties themselves, will promote fairness and equity in sliding
scale recovery agreements by vindicating "ballpark" proportionality,
yet will provide no sanctuary to the worthless guarantee.
The Tech.Bilt decision was a step in the right direction. Unfortu-
nately, this step is only one of many needed to put California back on
the path of fairness for all litigants.
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